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The Great Risk Shift? 





Weakening bargaining power of unions and the increasing integration of the world economy 
may affect the volatility of capital and labor incomes. This paper documents and explains 
changes in income volatility. Using a theoretical framework which builds distribution risk 
into a real business cycle model, hypotheses on the determinants of the relative volatility of 
capital and labor are derived. The model is tested using industry-level data. The data cover 11 
industrialized countries, 22 manufacturing and services industries, and a maximum of 35 
years. The paper has four main findings. First, the unconditional volatility of labor and capital 
incomes has declined, reflecting the decline in macroeconomic volatility. Second, the 
idiosyncratic component of income volatility has hardly changed over time. Third, cross-
sectional heterogeneity in the evolution of relative income volatilities is substantial. If 
anything, the labor incomes of high- and low-skilled workers have become more volatile in 
relative terms. Fourth, income volatility is related to variables measuring the bargaining 
power of workers. Trade openness has no significant impact. 
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1  Motivation 
Changes in labor market institutions and the increasing integration of the world economy may 
affect the volatility of capital and labor incomes, both in absolute and in relative terms. For 
the United States, it has been argued that households bear greater risks than they used to 
because of a shift in risk from the corporate to the private sector (Hacker 2006). Empirical 
studies find mixed evidence on the link between globalization and risk. Scheve and Slaughter 
(2004) report survey evidence which links perceived economic insecurity to the globalization 
process. A recent OECD study does not find a link between job market instability and 
globalization though (OECD 2007).  
One measure of changing risk patterns are changes in income volatility. Yet, while there is a 
large empirical literature on volatility at the aggregate, industry-, or firm-level, little is known 
about changes in the relative volatility of capital and labor incomes. At the aggregate level, 
there has been a Great Moderation in aggregate output volatility (Blanchard and Simon 2001, 
Stock and Watson 2002), but literature on the evolution of firm-level volatility has remained 
inconclusive (Davis and Kahn 2007). Household-level studies on income volatility based on 
US data show an increase in the volatility of earnings (Comin et al. 2006, Shin and Solon 
2008) and consumption (Gorbachova 2007). Others argue that an increase in income volatility 
has not been a universal phenomenon (Jensen and Shore 2008). Earlier research has also used 
cross-country data on consumption volatility (Kose et al. 2007) or industry-level data on 
output volatility (Di Givanni and Levchenko 2008, Braun and Larrain 2005). None of these 
papers studies changes in the volatility of labor income across countries or industries, in 
particular in relation to the volatility of capital income. 
This paper studies changes in the volatility of labor and capital incomes. For this purpose, 
industry-level data for 11 industrialized countries, 22 manufacturing and services industries, 
and a maximum time period of 35 years (1970-2004) are used. The paper addresses the 
following three questions. First, what have been the trends in the absolute volatility of labor 
and capital income across industrialized countries? Second, has the volatility of labor income 
relative to that of capital income changed? Third, what are the determinants of income 
volatility?    3
The empirical analysis is motivated by a real business cycle model with distributional risk 
(Danthine, Donaldson, and Siconolfi 2008).
1 The model features two types of agents – 
workers who do not hold financial assets and shareholders who own the capital stock of the 
economy. Hence, financial market participation is limited. The income of workers is insured 
against idiosyncratic shocks via an implicit insurance contract. The terms of this contract are 
related to social factors, political preferences, and the degree of competition on global 
markets. The distribution of incomes is subject to stochastic shocks, which interact with 
standard productivity shocks. Distributive shocks have an impact on the level of incomes as 
well as on the volatility of incomes.
 2 The implications of the model are brought to the data by 
testing the impact of industry-specific volatility, political preferences, and trade openness on 
the volatility of labor and capital incomes.
3 
The model’s assumption that financial market participation is limited is supported by 
empirical studies. Mankiw and Zeldes (1990) find that a substantial fraction of US households 
does not participate in the stock market. And despite the increase in the width and depth of 
financial markets since the early 1990s, households’ financial assets remain highly 
concentrated within a relative small share of the population. (See Lusardi and Mitchell (2007) 
for the US or DIW (2007) for Germany.) Hence, many households must resort to partial 
insurance mechanisms to smooth consumption fluctuations outside credit markets (Blundell et 
al. 2008), including within-firm insurance mechanisms of the type studied in Danthine et al. 
(2008). 
In line with most of the literature in the field, volatility is measured as the standard deviation 
of the idiosyncratic component of income growth in an industry. The idiosyncratic or 
conditional component of income growth is extracted using the multifactor residual model by 
Pesaran (2006). This model accounts for observed and unobserved common factors affecting 
incomes, and the response to these factors is allowed to be heterogeneous across industries.  
                                                 
1   The focus of their paper is on an explanation for the equity risk premium. 
2   Bottazzi et al. (1996) show that redistributive shocks such as shifts in the bargaining power of workers 
affect the correlations between capital and labor income as well. In contrast, the focus in this paper is on the 
volatility of income. 
3   A related branch of the labor market literature analyzes the correlation between labor income and profits 
at the firm-level. (See, e.g., Nickell and Wadhwani (1990) for the UK or Gürtzgen (2005) for Germany.)     4
This paper has five parts. In Part Two, I describe the database and provide key descriptive 
statistics for income volatility. In Part Three, hypotheses on the determinants of income 
volatility are derived from a theoretical model by Danthine et al. (2008). In Part Four, the 
determinants of absolute and relative volatilities of capital and labor income are analyzed. Part 
Five concludes. Results highlight the importance of distinguishing between idiosyncratic and 
macroeconomic factors contributing to industry-level volatility. Unconditional volatility of 
labor and capital incomes has shown a similar downward trend as aggregate GDP – there has 
been a Great Moderation of incomes. Once macroeconomic factors are accounted for, time 
trends are less distinct. If anything, the relative volatility of the income of low-skilled workers 
has increased. Regression results show that a higher bargaining power of labor lowers the 
volatility of labor income. Trade openness has no significant impact. 
2  Descriptive Statistics 
While it is often presumed that labor income volatility has increased, little cross-country 
evidence on income volatility exists. Most studies focus on the volatility of output at the 
industry-level
4 or use household-level data for selected countries such as the US.
5  Before 
turning to possible explanations for changes in income volatility, stylized facts on the 
evolution of the volatility in labor and capital incomes across countries, industries, and time 
are thus be presented. This section starts with a description of the database and the method 
used to compute volatilities. Note that the focus of this section is mostly descriptive. 
Explanations for volatility patterns will be given below (Sections 3 and 4). 
2.1 Industry-level  Data 
This paper uses industry-level data from the EUKLEMS database, which provides detailed 
growth accounting information for Europe, Japan, and the United States.
6 The data cover the 
period 1970-2005, and they include primary, secondary, and tertiary industries. One 
advantage of these data is that they give consistent measures of the compensation of capital, 
                                                 
4   See, e.g., Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2008) or Braun and Larrain (2005). 
5   See, e.g., Shin and Solon (2008), Davis and Kahn (2007), Jensen and Shore (2008), or Comin et al. 
(2006). 
6   See Timmer et al. (2007) for a more detailed description of the data and of methodological issues. Dew-
Becker and Gordon (2007) use these data to study the link between employment growth and productivity.   5
the compensation of labor, and on productivity. Labor compensation is also split into the 
compensation of high-skilled, medium-skilled, and low-skilled workers. As workers at 
different skill-levels are likely to differ in their access to capital markets and their ability to 
insure risks, this information is particular valuable for the purpose of this paper.  
Restricting the analysis to those countries which provide a breakdown of labor compensation 
by skill level gives a dataset for 22 industries and 11 countries. Details on the data are given 
in the appendix; Table 1 provides summary statistics. Because information on incomes by 
skill level are available only starting in the 1980s for some countries, two panel datasets are 
created: 
o  Panel 1 is “short and wide”. It contains 11 countries (Austria, Denmark, Spain, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, UK, USA), 22 sectors, and 21 
years (1982-2002). The total cross-section dimension is N = 241. 
o  Panel 2 is “long and narrow”. It contains four countries (Germany, Italy, UK, USA) 
(N = 87). It runs from 1970 to 2004 (T = 35). 
The focus is on income volatility. From a welfare perspective, a more relevant measure of 
volatility or risk facing private households might be the volatility of consumption. This paper 
does not use consumption data for two reasons. First, reliable information on the consumption 
of workers by industry and across different countries is, to the best of my knowledge, not 
available. Moreover, I am interested in a comparison of the volatility of capital and labor 
incomes, and the industry-level statistics used here provide consistent measures of these types 
of incomes. Second, volatility of incomes can be considered a proxy for the volatility of 
consumption, in particular for rule-of-thumb consumers who do not have access to credit 
markets to smoothen consumption over time. 
2.2 Measuring  Conditional  and Unconditional Volatility 
In Section 3 below, I will present a theoretical model explaining how implicit contracts insure 
workers against idiosyncratic volatility. To bring the implications of this model to the data, 
the idiosyncratic component of income volatility needs to be distinguished from the 
macroeconomic component. This idiosyncratic volatility will be labeled conditional volatility 
whereas the unconditional volatility additionally captures macroeconomic factors. 
The measure of conditional volatility used here is the residual of a regression of log income 
growth on macroeconomic factors. Not all of these macroeconomic factors are readily 
observable. Instead, some unobserved factors may hit all sectors and countries alike. To   6
distinguish observed and unobserved macroeconomic factors, the multifactor residual model 
by Pesaran (2006) is used. The logic of this model is as follows. Suppose that income growth 
is given by:  
it it i t i it x d y ε β α + + = ' ' ˆ         ( 1 )    
where  N i ,..., 2 , 1 =  is the number of cross sections (industry-country pairs) and  T t ,..., 2 , 1 =  is 
the number of years. Equation (1) states that income growth depends on a  1 × k  vector of 
observable macroeconomic factors ( t d ) and a vector of observed regressors ( it x ). The errors 
are assumed to have a multifactor structure: 
it t i it u f + = ' γ ε            ( 2 )    
where  t f  is an  1 × m  vector of unobserved macroeconomic factors, and  it u  are the individual-
specific (idiosyncratic) errors which are assumed to be distributed independently of  t d  and 
it x . The unobserved factors can be correlated with  t d  and  it x , hence the individual-specific 
regressors are modeled according to: 
it t i t i it v f d A x + Γ + = ' '         ( 3 )  
where  i A  and  i Γ  are factor loading matrices, and  it v  are components of  it x  which are 
independent of the macroeconomic factors.   
In most applications, the interest is in the slope coefficient  i β  in equation (1). Instead, the 
main interest in this paper is the idiosyncratic term  it u , which gives the idiosyncratic 
component of income growth which is uncorrelated to observed and unobserved 
macroeconomic factors. The key challenge is to isolate developments at the industry-level 
from aggregate developments while taking into account that some of the macroeconomic 
factors are unobserved. To isolate factors which affect all industries and countries ( t d , t f ) 
from country-industry-specific variables ( it x ), income growth is thus regressed on observed 
and unobserved macroeconomic factors. These regressions are run separately for each of the 
cross-sections, and the residuals from these regressions are retained.  
This multifactor residual model is applied to the “long and narrow” panel, including four 
observed macroeconomic factors ( t d  ) (growth in GDP per capita, inflation, energy prices, 
and trade openness). Following Pesaran (2006), the unobserved macroeconomic factors ( t f  ) 
can be proxied through the sample means of country-industry-specific variables. This paper   7
uses output growth, mean TFP growth, and the mean change in relative prices across 
industries. The dependent variable is the log growth rate of labor or capital income, 
respectively.  
Since the multifactor residual model requires sufficiently long time series, the methodology 
described above cannot be applied to the “short and wide” panel. For this panel, the 
idiosyncratic component of income growth is obtained by running a pooled regression of log 
income growth on a full set of country-year, industry-year, and country-industry fixed effects. 
The purpose of these regressions is to demean income growth rates and to purge then from 
macroeconomic developments affecting all sectors and countries alike. These regressions are 
run for each of the skill groups separately, thus accounting for skill-specific trends in wages 
(see Katz 1994). 
With a measure of idiosyncratic income growth at hand, rolling average standard deviations of 
growth rates over a five year window are computed:  








k i k t i it u u u σ      ( 4 )  
where  it u ˆ  is the idiosyncratic component of income growth obtained as the residual of the 
regressions described above, and  i u ˆ  is the corresponding mean. Equation (4) is applied to the 
volatility of incomes at different skill levels and to capital income.  
2.3 Income  Volatility 
Graph 1 plots income volatility, distinguishing the “wide and short” Panel 1 (Graphs 1a-1d) 
from the “long and narrow” Panel 2 (Graphs 1e-1g).
7 For each of these panels, the volatility of 
labor incomes (Graphs 1a and 1e), of capital income (Graphs 1b and 1f), and the relative 
volatility of labor incomes as the ratio between these two (Graph 1c and 1g) are plotted.  
Graph 1d additionally shows trends in the shares of capital and labor in total income. Overall, 
the median labor share across industries and countries has fluctuated between 0.71 and 0.75 in 
the 20 years under study for Panel 1. Breaking up labor income shows an increase in the 
                                                 
7   Volatility for year t gives the volatility in the subsequent five year interval [t, t+5].    8
compensation going to high- and medium-skilled workers and a decline in the share going to 
low-skilled workers.
8  
In Graphs 1a and 1b, the absolute volatilities of conditional and unconditional labor and 
capital incomes are plotted. The unconditional volatility is represented by the dashed lines. 
There has been a negative time trend, which has partly reversed in recent years. In this sense, 
there has been a Great Moderation not only with regard to output volatility but also in the 
volatility of labor and capital incomes. While exhibiting similar trends, the volatility of capital 
income has been about twice as high as the volatility of labor incomes. 
At the aggregate level, the causes for the Great Moderation in terms of output volatility are 
subject to a lively debate. The jury is still out on the question whether “Good Policy”, in 
particular a more stabilizing monetary policy, or “Good Luck”, i.e. the absence of major 
shocks, is the main cause of the Great Moderation. (See Benati and Surico (2008) or 
Giannone et al. (2007) for recent contributions to this debate.) This paper does not take a 
stance in this debate. Instead, it uses macroeconomic factors to compute idiosyncratic 
volatilities which capture both sets of explanations. 
After accounting for macroeconomic factors, time trends of the idiosyncratic component of 
volatility, given by the solid lines, look different. Not only has the conditional volatility of 
labor income been only about one third to one half of the unconditional volatility, it has also 
shown no marked trend over time.
9 As a consequence, the gap between the unconditional and 
the conditional volatility of labor income has narrowed. The relative importance of 
idiosyncratic volatility, in other words, has increased. By and large, the time series properties 
of volatilities computed for the “long and narrow” Panel 2 (Graphs 1e and 1f), which are 
based on the multifactor residual model described above, confirm these findings. 
The similar time patterns of volatilities for capital and labor income might indicate that 
relative volatilities have not changed much. Graphs 1c and 1g show that this is not generally 
the case. Looking at Panel 1 first, the unconditional relative volatility of labor income 
(Graph 1c) has shown a weak downward trend, which has reversed in recent years. The 
relative idiosyncratic volatility has been much lower throughout, and it has declined for total 
                                                 
8   Behind these numbers are, of course, changes in the total amount of hours worked and in wages per 
hour.  
9   This is consistent with earlier findings in Gottschalk and Moffit (1994) who report no significant trend 
in their conditional measure of income volatility at the sector level.   9
employment, medium- and high-skilled employment. For low-skilled employment, in 
contrast, it has increased. Relative idiosyncratic volatility has, in addition, been consistently 
below relative total volatility. This is consistent with the hypothesis that capital owners have a 
greater exposure to idiosyncratic risk than workers.  
Evidence for the longer Panel 2 and using the Pesaran-methodology described above 
(Graph 1g), confirm the major findings for Panel 1. Similar time trends for income volatility 
at the household level have been reported by Gottschalk and Moffit (1994). 
Prima facie, these changes in relative volatility over time could be taken as evidence that risk-
sharing mechanisms within sectors have changed. Table 2 provides more formal tests of 
changes in absolute and relative volatilities over time, distinguishing between countries and 
industries. The year 1990 is chosen as a breakpoint. Using the year 1985 instead, which is 
typically considered the start of the Great Moderation period, for the “long and narrow” panel 
gives similar qualitative results. Table 2 gives the difference in volatilities moving from the 
first to the second period, i.e. a positive sign indicates that volatility has fallen, and a negative 
sign indicates that volatility has increased. The table also reports results of one-sided t-tests 
for the significance of differences in the means. 
Table 2 shows that the changes in median volatility reported in Graph 1 hide a substantial 
degree of heterogeneity in volatility patterns. Considering the distinction between industries 
first (Table 2a), there is a relative consistent pattern of a decline in absolute labor income 
volatility, which is driven by medium-skilled employment. For relative volatilities as well as 
for the volatility of high-skilled labor compensation and capital compensation, patterns are 
more heterogeneous. There is no clear dividing line between manufacturing and services 
industries in terms of changes in volatilities over time.  
As regards the distinction between workers at different skill levels, the picture for total and 
medium-skilled employment is mixed. In some sectors, relative volatilities have increased. In 
others, volatilities have decreased. For low-skilled workers, in contrast, there has been an 
increase in relative volatilities. In 11 out of 20 industries, volatilities of low-skilled labor 
income have increased significantly. Relative volatilities of high-skilled labor income have 
increased as well, but these increases are significant in only four industries. Breaking down 
the data by country (Table 2b) gives a similar tendency of an increase in relative volatilities of 
high- and low-skilled workers’ incomes.  
By and large, the results using Panel 1 and Panel 2 are similar in terms of the time trends in 
the data. Since Panel 1 provides richer cross-section dynamics than Panel 2, the main   10
regressions results that follow in Part 4 will be based on Panel 1, the “short and narrow” 
panel. 
3  Relative Income Volatility and Distribution Risk: A Theoretical 
Illustration 
One finding of the previous section is that, overall, the volatility of labor and capital incomes 
has fallen. At the same time, the relative volatility of labor income has increased in some 
countries and industries, particularly for low-skilled workers. A standard neoclassical model 
with competitive labor markets and a Cobb-Douglas technology would have difficulties 
explaining these patterns in the data. In such a model, factors shares would be constant, and 
labor and capital income would fluctuate proportionally with the volatility of output or TFP. 
This section summarizes the implications of a real business cycle (RBC) model by Danthine 
et al. (2008) which helps explaining the stylized facts in the data. The main departure from 
standard RBC models are the assumptions of a redistributive shock and of limited asset 
market participation. Via an implicit insurance contract, workers are insured against 
idiosyncratic shocks, and labor income varies less than proportionally with output. Workers 
pay for this insurance contract by accepting lower incomes. Shareholders, in contrast, have a 
more volatile income and are compensated by a higher equity premium. 
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i C C  denotes the corresponding consumption of the foreign good. Foreign variables are 
denoted by an asterix. The model presented here departs from the closed-economy model in 
Danthine et al. (2008) by assuming that households consume domestic and foreign goods. 
Changes in relative prices for these goods thus add a potential insurance mechanism. 
The aggregate constraints in this economy are given by 
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j C C  = consumption of the foreign good. Investment and holdings of the 
capital stock are purely domestic, i.e. there is trade in goods only. Equation (5) gives the 
resource constraint, equation (6) describes the process of capital accumulation, and equation 
(7) is the balance of payments constraint. 
Since workers do not participate in financial markets, they optimally choose the level of 
consumption of domestic and foreign goods as well as their optimal labor input: 
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t i l l w c p c     (8), 
where β  = discount factor, 
W
t c  = period consumption, and  t p  = relative price of foreign 
goods (in units of the domestic goods). Optimizing (8) gives three first order conditions. 




t i w c c = +
*
, , . Workers 
thus behave as “rule-of-thumb” consumers. According to the second condition, workers work 
their full-time endowment:  1 = t l . Finally, they choose their consumption of domestic and 
foreign goods such that the marginal rate of substitution equals the relative price of the two 

















. By adjusting the relative consumption of home and foreign goods, 
households can partly insure their consumption against fluctuations in income. 
The optimization problem of shareholders is more complex since they not only choose the 
optimal level of consumption but also the optimal holdings of stocks and bonds: 
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*  (9) 
where 
e
t q  = stock price, 
b
t q  = bond price,  t z  = stock holdings,  t b  = holdings of one-period 
discount bonds, and  t d  = dividend. The corresponding first order conditions for stocks, bonds, 
and relative consumption are given by:  
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Equations (10a) and (10b) show how shareholders allocate their consumption optimally over 
time, equation (10c) gives the intra-temporal optimization condition. Only the latter insurance 
mechanism is also available to workers.  
Finally, there is a representative firm which maximizes its pre-dividend stock market value 
(
e
t t q d + ) period-by-period choosing the optimal level of investment ( t i ), and taking the 
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under the following constraints:  
  ()
b
t t t t t t t t t t q b b i w l l k f d + − − − = λ
~
,         ( 1 2 a )  
  ()t t t i k k + − = + δ 1 1 ,  1 = t l          (12b) 




t t c u c u 1 1
~ = μ             ( 1 2 c ) .  
The only non-standard element in this model is the risk-sharing contract given by (12c). It 
states that optimal risk sharing between owners and workers takes place on a period-by-period 
basis after  t μ  has been determined.
10 If  t μ = 1, the marginal utilities of high- and low-skilled 
workers would be identical. In the more general case ( ≠ t μ 1), marginal utilities are 
proportional to each other. Shareholders equalize their marginal utilities across time and states 
of nature by participating in financial markets.
11 By assumption, workers do not participate in 
financial markets, but the risk-sharing contract indirectly allows them to smooth consumption 
across states of nature as well. In this sense, labor markets are assuming a risk-sharing 
function (Danthine and Donaldson 1989). The steady-state value of  t μ is determined by a 
bargaining process which is outside the scope of this model. It is subject to stochastic 
fluctuations. By incorporating such a mechanism into an otherwise standard RBC model, 
                                                 
10   An alternative modeling strategy would be to assume the presence of a central planner who allocates 
consumption based on a social welfare function with  t μ  being the weight of workers. 
11   Risk diversification in this model takes place with regard to different states of nature. Similar 
implications would hold in a multi-industry model in which risks can be diversified across industries.    13
implications of  t μ  not only for relative consumption shares but also for the relative volatility 
of labor and capital income can be derived.  
The firm’s first order conditions are given by: 









t t c u c u 1 1 = μ          (13b) 
1 = t l            ( 1 3 c ) .  
Imposing equilibrium conditions and resource constraints, the first order conditions for 
workers, shareholders, and for the firm define the equilibrium of the economy.  
The model has the following implications for the volatility of absolute and relative incomes. 
First, implicit contracts insure workers against fluctuations of income due to technology 
shocks. The income of workers should thus not fluctuate with idiosyncratic, industry-specific 
changes in TFP if implicit contracts provide full insurance. Also, the income of workers 
should be smooth relative to the income of shareholders. This result is in line with the 
empirical evidence presented in Graph 1, which consistently shows a lower volatility of labor 
incomes than of capital income. Note that this does not imply that the consumption of 
shareholders is more volatile. Instead, shareholders smooth their consumption by diversifying 
their income via financial markets and across different industries. This is not reflected in their 
income earned in a specific industry. 
Second, labor market arrangements that affect the implicit contract between workers and 
shareholders have an impact on the volatility of relative incomes. The lower the bargaining 
power of workers, the higher is the relative volatility of their incomes. These labor market 
arrangements can be defined in a narrow sense as reflecting union density, but they can also 
reflect societal and political preferences concerning income volatility. 
Third, the impact of increased trade on the volatility of consumption is ambiguous. On the one 
hand, increased competitive pressure from abroad and the “threat of offshoring” might 
weaken the bargaining power of workers. Hence, the volatility of their incomes could 
increase. Note that, in the above model, the bargaining power of workers is not modeled 
explicitly. Harrison (2002) has a model in which the bargaining strength of workers depends 
on global market conditions. She argues that the labor share will fall when it becomes less 
costly to relocate capital, when it becomes more costly to relocate labor, or when the foreign 
wage premium falls. On the other hand, workers can use adjustments in the composition of   14
their consumption basket to smooth shocks. This possibility of consumption smoothing would 
not be reflected in their labor incomes. 
Fourth, the focus of the theoretical model is on the insurance of workers against idiosyncratic 
and thus industry-specific shocks. At least in a domestic context, macroeconomic shocks are 
not insurable and should affect workers and shareholders alike. Hence, the focus of the 
empirical analysis will be on assessing the importance of risk-sharing mechanisms for 
workers’ relative idiosyncratic income risk.  The analysis will be based on the conditional 
volatility measures described above.  
Fifth, Danthine and Donaldson (1989) use an overlapping generation’s model and distinguish 
between old (high-skilled) workers, young (low-skilled) workers, and the owners of the 
capital stock. Old workers and capital owners enter into a risk-sharing contract similar to the 
one described above. For young workers, such contracts are not available. These workers 
receive consumption insurance via unemployment insurance which is paid by taxing the 
firms. The implication is that incomes of young, low-skilled workers should be more volatile 
than incomes of high-skilled workers. Following this logic, more generous unemployment 
insurance as an alternative insurance mechanism should increase the volatility of labor 
incomes. 
4  Determinants of Income Volatility 
The theoretical model presented above suggests a number of variables which affect the 
relative volatility of labor and capital income such as the bargaining power of workers, trade 
integration, or political preferences. This section starts by presenting measures for these 
variables, which are then used to explain the absolute and relative volatilities of capital and 
labor.  
4.1 Explanatory  Variables 
Bargaining power: The bargaining power of workers is measured in four ways. First, from 
Bassanini and Duval (2006), country-level information on union density is obtained. Higher 
union density should be associated with a higher bargaining power of workers and a lower 
volatility of labor incomes. Second, the share of high-, medium-, and low-skilled workers in 
total employment in each industry as provided in EUKLEMS is included. This variable also 
picks up shifts in the relative demand for labor in each skill group over time. Third, the labor   15
share in each industry is added as a regressor.
12 In a Cobb-Douglas-world, this variable should 
not change much over time, and it should have no impact on the volatility of labor income. 
Yet, as Graph 1d shows, labor shares have changed over time. It will be tested whether this 
has had an impact on income volatility. Fourth, for the US, time-varying information on union 
membership by industry is used. 
International openness: The degree of international openness of a sector could affect the 
bargaining between workers and owners through a “threat of offshoring”. The result could be 
an increase in the income volatility of workers.
13 This threat could be measured through the 
degree of offshorability of tasks that are performed in a given industry. Yet, including an 
offshoring measure directly has not been feasible as, to the best of my knowledge, proxies for 
services offshoring for a large set of countries, sectors, and years, are not available. (See 
Jensen and Kletzer (2007) for a recent survey.) Openness is therefore measured through the 
export share in production and the import penetration ratio taken from the OECD’s STAN 
database. This information is available for the years 1980-2004 for nine main manufacturing 
sectors included in the database. For the panel starting in the 1970s, additional information is 
available from the World Trade Flows database (Feenstra et al. 2005), which provides 
bilateral trade data at the four-digit level.
14 The data are aggregated to match the country- and 
industry-dimension of the remaining data. As the STAN-database, these data include 
information for manufacturing sectors only.  
Political preferences: To measure how political and societal preferences affect the bargaining 
position of workers, two indicators are used. The first comes from the Database on Political 
Institutions compiled by the World Bank, which provides detailed information on the type of 
government or political system (Keefer 2007). From this database, a dummy variable 
(EXECRLC) is retrieved, which gives the main political orientation of the chief political 
executive (Right, Left, Center). If the general political environment affects the allocation of 
income between capital and labor, one would expect executives with a political orientation 
towards the left (right) to have a positive impact on the share of income going to labor 
                                                 
12   Total labor share and the share of employment by skill group have correlations of below 0.1, hence 
multicolinearity is not an issue.  
13   Empirical results in Bergin et al. (2007) show that labor income volatility in the US and Mexico is 
higher in outsourcing industries. 
14   I am grateful to Julian di Giovanni and Andrei A. Levchenko for sharing their Stata code on industry 
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(capital). Consequently, left-wing parties would be expected to smooth income for workers to 
a greater extent than right-wing parties. Dummies for left- and right-wing chief political 
executives are included, hence the coefficients must be interpreted relative to political 
executives coming from the center. Overall, the majority of observations is for right-wing 
governments (49%), followed by left-wing (41%), and centrist governments (10%). 
The second measure of political preferences is the top marginal income tax rate. This variable 
captures preferences towards redistributive policies. If political and societal preferences had 
an impact on firm-level bargaining, one would expect higher marginal income tax rates to be 
associated with a stronger bargaining power of workers. The expected sign is negative for the 
volatility of labor income. Of course, one could also argue for a positive expected sign if firms 
and workers consider a trade off between, on the one hand, firm- or industry-level insurance 
and, on the other hand, redistribution mechanisms and those provided by the tax and social 
security system. 
Financial market development: The degree of development of financial markets should affect 
the willingness of capital owners to provide an implicit risk-sharing contract to workers. If 
financial markets are not very well developed, owners of capital cannot diversify risks and are 
less willing to bear risk than in a situation in which financial markets are well-developed. To 
capture this, the degree of stock market capitalization relative to GDP, as taken from the 
World Bank’s World Development Indicators, is included. The expected sign is positive for 
capital income and negative for labor income. 
Volatility of TFP: The idiosyncratic volatility of total factor productivity (TFP) at the 
industry-level is used as a proxy of industry-specific developments. TFP volatility is 
computed in an analogous way to the volatility of labor and capital incomes. It should, 
according to the theoretical model, not affect the idiosyncratic volatility of labor incomes if 
implicit insurance contracts are effective. Shareholders, in contrast, insure consumption 
against idiosyncratic shocks by buying and selling financial assets. Their incomes derived 
from owning the capital stock of a particular industry, which are measured here, should 
fluctuate with idiosyncratic developments at the industry-level.  
Unemployment insurance: Danthine and Donaldson (1989) argue that unemployment 
insurance can serve as a substitute for within-firm insurance mechanisms. The more generous 
unemployment insurance, the higher would be the expected volatility of labor income. The 
initial unemployment benefit replacement ratio and the period for which unemployment 
benefits are paid to are included as regressors account for this. More generous unemployment   17
insurance as an alternative risk-sharing mechanism would make workers more willing to 
accept on-the-job risk. Hence, the expected sign is positive. 
In addition, macroeconomic developments affecting all countries and sectors are captured 
through time fixed effects. To account for the specific circumstances of the German post-
reunification period, a dummy variable for this period is included.
15 
4.2  Regression Results  
The variables described above are used to explain the absolute and relative volatilities of 
capital and labor income, Table 3 has the results for the absolute volatility of labor income, 
Table 4 presents results for the absolute volatility of capital income, and Table 5 has results 
for relative incomes. 
According to Table 3, a higher volatility of TFP increases the absolute volatility of labor 
income (Columns 1-4). If insurance mechanisms inside the firms via implicit contracts would 
be fully operative, fluctuations in TFP should not affect labor incomes. One reason for the 
relative consistent positive effect of TFP fluctuations on labor income could be that some 
workers – in particular high-skilled workers – insure their consumption via participation in 
financial markets. For low-skilled workers, TFP volatility is insignificant, which is consistent 
with the presence of within-industry insurance mechanisms.  
The two main measures for workers’ bargaining power – country-wide union density and the 
industry-level labor share – are insignificant. Results for the third measure of bargaining 
power – the number of workers in a particular skill group – are interesting as they suggest that 
being numerous lowers the volatility of high-skilled and medium-skilled workers but not of 
low-skilled workers. Note that this variable also captures shifts in the relative demand for 
workers at different skill-levels. In this sense, the increased demand for workers with higher 
skill levels has been associated with a decline in the volatility of their incomes.  
Unemployment insurance could serve as a substitute for implicit contracts within the firm, 
hence increasing the volatility of labor income. Results in fact show a positive and significant 
impact of the benefit replacement rate on labor income volatility. Results for the benefit 
duration depend on the specification. The effect is negative for high- and low-skilled workers 
                                                 
15   Although output volatility in Germany has been high in the immediate post-unification period (1990-
1991), the corresponding dummy has a negative and significant sign. Hence, workers’ incomes have been 
shielded from the increase in output volatility.   18
for the full sample and positive for all workers using the restricted (manufacturing) sample 
including measures for trade openness. 
Results for the political variables show a positive impact of the chief political executive being 
from a left-wing party in two specifications. For high-skilled workers, this finding would be 
consistent with expectations, for low-skilled workers, in contrast, the expected sign would be 
negative. The dummy for the chief political executive officer being from a right-wing party is 
insignificant.  
Columns 5-8 present results including stock market capitalization and trade openness. Greater 
openness for trade has no significant impact on the volatility of labor income. This finding 
would be in line with earlier work, which has difficulties tracing differences in the elasticity 
of labor demand to the degree of internationalization. 
The impact of stock market capitalization on the volatility of labor income is positive for 
high-skilled and low-skilled workers. This has two possible interpretations. First, a more 
developed stock market provides greater possibilities to diversify risk, hence increasing the 
willingness of those (high-skilled) workers with access to the stock market to accept more 
volatile incomes. Second, high-skilled workers’ remuneration might be directly tight to the 
performance of the stock market via stock options and other forms of bonus payments, hence 
increasing the volatility of their incomes. This explanation would be incompatible with the 
positive impact of stock market capitalization on the income volatility of low-skilled workers 
though. 
Table 4 presents different specifications for the absolute volatility of capital income, using 
overlapping measures of volatility as before. In addition, results using squared residuals and 
non-overlapping observations for each 5-year period (quasi-panel) are reported as robustness 
checks.  
There are three main results which are consistent across specifications. First, higher volatility 
of TFP increases the volatility of capital income, and the coefficient estimates are higher than 
those estimated for labor incomes. In line with the theoretical model, capital income thus 
reflects idiosyncratic industry-level volatility to a greater degree than labor incomes do. 
Second, a higher labor share in an industry increases the volatility of capital income. This is 
consistent with the theoretical model as well. Third, a higher benefit replacement rate 
increases the volatility of capital income, and the point estimate is higher than the one for 
labor income. This finding is at odds with expectations as more generous unemployment 
insurance provides an alternative to within-firm insurance mechanisms. Hence, the expected   19
sign for capital income volatility would be negative. The remaining variables are insignificant, 
except for a weakly significant positive impact of the chief political executive being from a 
right-wing party. 
Table 5 brings these two sets of results together and uses the ratio of the volatility of labor and 
capital income as the dependent variable. Consistent with the theoretical model, higher 
volatility of TFP lowers the volatility of labor incomes relative to that of capital income. Yet, 
this variable is significant only for high-skilled workers and – in one specification – for low-
skilled workers. 
Bargaining power has a significant impact on relative volatilities, consistent with the findings 
in Tables 3 and 4. The labor share has a negative sign, and it is significant in most 
specifications. Higher union density lowers the relative volatility of labor income as well. 
When restricting the sample to the manufacturing industries (Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8)), 
however, union density tends to become insignificant. For high- and medium-skilled workers, 
there is evidence that the share of these workers in the total labor force lowers the relative 
volatilities of their incomes. Being more numerous does not benefit the low-skilled workers 
though – the relative volatility of their labor incomes even increases in the share of low-
skilled workers in the labor force. Finally, the benefit replacement ratio and benefit duration 
are negative and significant in some specifications. This would be consistent with more 
generous unemployment insurance as a measure of union power. It would be inconsistent with 
more generous unemployment insurance acting as an alternative insurance mechanism. If this 
was the case, these variables should have a positive sign. 
Results for the political dummies support earlier findings but are not necessarily in line with 
expectations. If the chief political officer comes from a left-wing party, relative labor income 
volatility tends to be higher than in the base scenario of the executive being from the center. 
The dummy for political executives from right-wing parties, there are some positive 
coefficients. However, these results are not strong.  
A more developed stock market increases rather than decreases the relative volatility of labor 
incomes. The variables measuring export and import openness are insignificant. 
In sum, these findings support the mechanism stressed in the theoretical model in the sense 
that capital income is more sensitive to industry-specific developments than labor income. 
Also, a greater bargaining power of workers lowers the relative volatility of labor income.     20
4.3 Robustness 
To check the robustness of the results, several modifications of the baseline model have been 
tested. Individual countries have been dropped successively, time-varying sector fixed effects 
have been included as regressors, the squared residual instead of volatility computed over a 
five years window has been used as the dependent variable, and the model has been estimated 
using a quasi-panel of non-overlapping windows for the period 1975-2000. The following 
results are not reported but are available upon request. 
Drop countries: Dropping individual countries to check whether results are driven by a 
particular country shows that the results for the baseline specification of relative labor income 
volatility (Column 1 of Table 5) are quite robust. In particular, higher union density – as a 
measure of the bargaining power of workers in a given country – and a higher labor share – as 
a measure of bargaining power in a given industry – lower relative labor income volatility. 
Sector-year fixed effects: A full set of sector-year fixed effects have been included to check 
whether any of the explanatory variables might capture omitted time-varying effects at the 
sector-level.
16 Different trends in the offshorability of production and other shifts in industry 
structures could be captured by these variables. While the sector-year fixed effects cannot be 
interpreted in any meaningful way, including them allows testing for the robustness of the 
remaining results. Again, union density and the labor share generally retain their negative and 
significant signs. 
Squared residuals: To check the robustness of the results, the squared residuals are used as a 
measure of volatility. This measure has the advantage that it does not require the choice of a 
particular time window to compute volatilities. Its disadvantage is that it has a more erratic 
time-series behavior and thus generates extreme values of relative volatilities. For this reason, 
the squared residuals have not been used to compute relative volatilities. Using squared 
residuals of labor income growth as the dependent variable supports most of the qualitative 
results reported in Table 3. In particular results for unemployment insurance and the 
employment shares by skill level are very similar.  
Quasi-panel: Results for the quasi-panel confirm a couple of results concerning the 
determinants of the absolute volatility of labor income reported in Table 3. The degree of 
                                                 
16   A similar argument applies to country-year fixed effects. However, since some of the explanatory 
variables vary only at the country-level, including country-time fixed effects would imply that the effects of 
these variables cannot be measured anymore.   21
unionization and the shares of high- and medium-skilled workers have a negative impact, as 
expected. Stock market capitalization has a positive impact, as before. Using the quasi-panel 
for relative volatility, the main qualitative results reported in Table 5 are confirmed as well. 
The labor share in particular is negative and significant. Shifting the start of the quasi-panel 
year-by-year gives the most robust results the labor share and union density (both negative) 
and the dummy for the political left (positive). 
Industry-level unionization: For the US, time-varying information on union membership and 
coverage by industry is available.
17 Neither the degree of coverage of union nor the share of 
union members in total employment has a significant impact on absolute or relative 
volatilities though. This mirrors the finding of Gottschalk and Moffit (1994) who find little 
impact of the degree of unionization on the volatility of earnings at the individual level. 
Hence, the results for union density are driven by the cross-country variation in the data. 
System of equations: According to the theoretical model, the volatility of labor and capital 
incomes is the result of an optimization problem at the firm-level, and these variables are 
simultaneously determined. To account for this, I have re-estimated the model using a 
seemingly related regressions model. The institutional arrangements of the unemployment 
insurance system have been used to identify the equation specifying labor income volatility. 
Results confirm earlier findings. These results are also used to test whether the impact of the 
explanatory variables on labor and capital income volatility differs significantly. This is 
strongly supported. Labor income volatility reacts less to volatility of TFP than the volatility 
of capital income. It is also lower the higher is union density. The labor share has a positive 
and significant impact on the volatility of labor income for medium-skilled workers, but the 
coefficient estimate is significantly smaller than the one for capital income. Hence, the net 
effect of an increase in the labor share is to lower the relative volatility of labor income. 
Age of workers: To test the prediction of the model by Danthine and Donaldson (1989) that 
the income of young (low-skilled) workers should be more volatile than the income of old 
(high-skilled) workers, the age of the workforce is included. However, results do not support 
the predictions of the model. Instead, a higher share of younger workers (below the age of 29 
years) often lowered the volatility of labor income while a higher share of older workers 
(above the age of 50 years) in some specifications increased the volatility of labor income. 
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Top marginal income tax rate: As expected, the top marginal income tax rate has a negative 
impact on the relative volatility of labor income, in particular for low- and medium-skilled 
workers. This would be consistent with higher marginal tax rates reflecting a positive societal 
attitude towards income stability for low-skilled workers. 
Technological progress: Technological progress could increase the volatility of earnings if it 
leads to a faster depreciation of human capital and makes “more workers like new workers” 
(Katz 1994). To account for this, the log of ICT capital per worker is included. The impact is 
generally negative, in particular for relative volatilities. Hence, the stability of labor income 
has decreased rather than increased due to the increased use of ICT capital. 
Wages versus employment: Results so far have looked at total labor income, not allowing for 
different responses of employment and wages. As a further robustness tests, I have re-
estimated the determinants of labor income volatility separately. Splitting labor income into 
the two components wages and employment (hours worked) shows similar results for TFP 
volatility (positive), the replacement ratio (positive), and benefit duration (negative). The 
impact of union density is insignificant. The results for employment shares (negative for high- 
and medium-skilled, positive for low-skilled) are driven by adjustments of wage and 
employment volatility.  
Panel 2 versus Panel 1: Finally, the model has been re-estimated using the long and narrow 
panel starting in the 1970s for four countries rather than the wide and short panel starting in 
the 1980s. By and large, the results are similar although, of course, there is much less cross-
sectional variation in some of the explanatory variables. The most consistent result is a 
negative impact of the labor share on the relative volatility of labor income. 
5  Summary  
Output volatility has declined in industrialized countries but there has been a concern that the 
volatility of labor incomes could have increased. This paper has analyzed whether there has 
been a “risk shift” from capital to labor in the sense that the relative volatility of labor 
incomes has increased. To answer this question, the paper uses an industry-level database for 
industrialized countries and the past 35 years. 
Descriptive statistics show a decline in the unconditional volatility of labor and capital income 
growth, mirroring the Great Moderation of output volatility. When accounting for overall   23
macroeconomic developments and isolating the idiosyncratic component of income growth, 
industry-level volatility does not show any strong time trend though.  
In terms of the relative volatility between labor and capital, the paper shows heterogeneity 
across industries and countries. On average, the relative volatility of labor income has not 
changed much between the 1980s and 1990s. The same holds for incomes of workers with 
medium skill levels. There is, at the same time, evidence suggesting that the relative volatility 
of incomes of low-skilled workers has increased in some industries and countries. 
To motivate an empirical analysis of the determinants of income volatility, a real business 
cycle model with redistributive shocks has been used. The model assumes that workers and 
owners of the capital stock enter into an implicit contract which insures workers against 
idiosyncratic shocks. Hence, workers smooth consumption even though they to not participate 
in financial markets. The model predicts that capital income responds more to idiosyncratic 
volatility than labor income. Moreover, a decline in the bargaining power of workers 
increases the relative volatility of labor income.  
Empirical results explaining volatilities of capital and labor income support the mechanisms 
stressed in the theoretical model. Capital income volatility is more sensitive to sector-specific 
developments than labor income volatility. A greater bargaining power of workers lowers the 
relative volatility of labor income. Differences in trade openness across sectors do not have a 
significant impact on income volatilities. More developed stock markets, in contrast, tend to 
increase the relative volatility of labor incomes.  
In future work, it would be interesting to analyze relative income volatilities using firm-level 
data. The theoretical model used here assumes income (and consumption) smoothing within 
the context of employment relationship within a given firm. It assumes lifetime employment 
relationship, and workers are willing to accept wages below marginal productivity in 
exchange for income insurance. If job market turnover increases, such mechanisms 
presumably become more difficult to maintain, thus affecting risk sharing between capital and 
labor.   24
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7  Data Appendix 
The main data source is EU KLEMS. All data are freely available on the internet and can be 
downloaded from www.euklems.net. The version of March 2007 is used. See Timmer et al. 
(2007) for details on the data definitions and original sources. 
Real capital compensation (CAP): Nominal values were converted into constant US-Dollar by 
(i) converting values in national currency into US-Dollar using the Summers-Heston 
exchange rate series, adjusting for Euro conversion rates, and (ii) deflating by the US output 
price index in each sector. In addition to the outlier correction applied to all time series, the 
following cross-sections with incomplete data and recurring large changes were dropped: 
Finland – industries 20,F, H, N; Germany – 20, C, H; Netherlands – 30t33; all – 34t35; 
Austria – 36t37, N; Denmark – F; United Kingdom – F, J; France – M; Italy – M   
Labor compensation (LAB): labor compensation by skill level is obtained by multiplying total 
labor compensation (LAB) by the share of employment at each skill level in total labor 
compensation, i.e. (LABHS / 100) * LAB for high-skilled workers. Nominal values were 
converted into constant US-Dollar by (i) converting values in national currency into US-
Dollar using the Summers-Heston exchange rate series, adjusting for Euro conversion rates, 
and (ii) deflating by the US output price index in each sector. 
Total Factor Productivity (TFPva_I): TFP growth, both value-added and output-based. Output 
per hour growth minus capital deepening growth (= real capital growth – growth in total hours 
worked * capital’s share in output) 
Output (GO): Nominal values were converted into constant US-Dollar by(i) converting values 
in national currency into US-Dollar using the Summers-Heston exchange rate series, adjusting 
for Euro conversion rates, and (ii) deflating by the US output price index in each sector. 
Trade: (i) OECD Stan: Data on import-export ratios, the export share of production, and the 
import penetration ratio by industry, 1980-2004, for the following manufacturing sectors: 
Food, Textiles, Wood, Pulp & Paper, Chemicals, Non-metallic mineral products, Based 
metals, Machinery, Transport equipment, (ii) World Trade Flows: Data on bilateral import 
volumes obtained from Feenstra et al. (2005). SITC4 industry classification codes were 
converted into ISIC codes (Version 3) using industry concordances kindly provided by Julian 
di Giovanni and used in di Giovanni and Levchenko (2008). For the years before 1990, we 
use West German data to match the data to EUKLEMS. 
List of countries: The EU KLEMS database contains information on 27 countries in Europe 
plus Japan and the United States. However, due to incomplete time series and missing 
observations, in particular concerning a breakdown of employment by skill, we use only the 
following 11 countries: 
AUT = Austria, DNK = Denmark, ESP = Spain, FIN = Finland, FRA = France, GER = 
Germany ITA = Italy, JPN = Japan, NLD = Netherlands, UK = United Kingdom, USA = 
United States-SIC based 
List of industries: The EU KLEMS database contains industry-level data at different levels of 
aggregation. We use data at the 2-digit level, and we drop the sectors agriculture, fishing, and 
extra-territorial organizations due to missing and incomplete observations. Hence, we use data 
for the following sectors (sector codes based on NACE): 
15t16 = Food, Beverages and Tobacco; 17t19 = Textiles, Leather, and Footwear; 20 = Wood, 
products of wood, and cork; 21t22 = Pulp, paper, printing and publishing; 23t25 = Chemicals,   28
rubber, plastic, and fuels; 26 = Other non-metallic mineral products; 27t28 = Basic metals and 
fabricated metals; 29 = Machinery nec.; 30t33 = Electrical and optimal equipment; 34t35 = 
Transport equipment; C = Mining and quarrying; E = Electricity, gas, and water supply; F = 
Construction; G = wholesale and retail trade; H = Hotels and restaurants; I = Transport, 
storage, and communications; J = Financial intermediation, K = Real estate, renting, and 
business activities; L = Public administration and defense, social security; N = Health and 
social work; O = Other services 
In some countries, industry classifications have changed in the mid-1990s. Where available, 
the EUKLEMS database uses conversion tables provided by the national statistical offices. 
The change in the American classification system (from SIC87 to NAICS97) was more far-
reaching than of the most recent change in the European system.  
German dummy: Dummy variable equal to one for the years 1990 and 1991 for Germany to 
capture the unification effect. 
Labor market regulations: Data have been compiled by Bassanini and Duval (2006) and are 
available online. We use the following five indicators: 
o  Net union density: Share of workers affiliated with unions in % 
o  Benefit replacement rates: percentage of average before tax earnings covered 
through unemployment and social insurance programs 
o  Benefit duration: duration of unemployment benefits 
Stock market development: market value of shares traded relative to GDP (in %), taken from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI) on CD-rom. 
Political dummies: 0/1-dummies for the main political orientation of the chief political 
executive (left / right / center) taken from the Database on Political Institutions by the World 
Bank (Keefer 2007).  
Marginal tax rates: Data on personal income top marginal tax rates in OECD countries for the 
years 1975-2005 are taken from the Tax Policy Center 
(http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=477). Missing values for 
the individual year 1983 were ipolated for the following countries: Denmark, Italy, Japan, and 
Spain.  
Inflation: Change in the price level of consumption (CP) is the PPP over GDP divided by the 
exchange rate times 100. The PPP of GDP or any component is the national currency value 
divided by the real value in international dollars. The PPP and the exchange rate are both 
expressed as national currency units per US dollar. From Penn World Table 6.1 (PWT 6.1). 
Energy prices index: HWWI-World energy price index US-Dollar based, 2000=100   29
Graph 1: Volatility of Labor and Capital Income 
The following graphs plot the median volatility of labor and capital income for 11 European countries, the US 
and Japan across 22 industries. Volatility is defined as the standard deviation of real income growth over a 
rolling 5-year window. Unconditional uses the growth rates of income; conditional uses the residuals of a 
regression of these growth rates on fixed effects and year dummies. For Graphs 1e-1g, conditional volatilities 
have been obtained using the multifactor residual model by Pesaran (2006) described in the main body of the 
text. Volatility in t is defined for the subsequent period [t, t+4]. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev.  Min  Max 
5-year moving average conditional volatilities          
Total labor income  6,394 0.028 0.027  0.003  0.549
High-skilled income  6,394 0.060 0.049  0.003  0.476
Medium-skilled income  6,394 0.037 0.032  0.002  0.563
Low-skilled income  6,394 0.050 0.044  0.002  0.591
Capital income  6,350 0.019 0.027  0.001  1.405
Output 6,284 0.034 0.026  0.003  0.274
TFP 6,306 0.037 0.028  0.003  0.505
Relative conditional volatility (labor / capital income)          
Total 5,677 0.288 0.318  0.006  5.233
High-skilled 5,677 0.657 0.732  0.013  16.140
Medium-skilled 5,677 0.388 0.425  0.007  7.310
Low-skilled 5,677 0.570 0.820  0.008  18.328
5-year moving average unconditional volatilities       
Total labor income  6,394 0.111 0.053  0.006  0.740
High-skilled income  6,394 0.128 0.062  0.007  0.688
Medium-skilled income  6,394 0.115 0.054  0.006  0.747
Low-skilled income  6,394 0.128 0.060  0.011  0.749
Capital income  6,350 0.022 0.032  0.001  1.840
Output 6,284 0.106 0.049  0.005  0.346
TFP 6,306 0.042 0.034  0.002  0.622
Relative unconditional volatility (labor / capital income)          
Total 5,677 0.783 0.488  0.058  10.504
High-skilled 5,677 0.945 0.676  0.053  10.592
Medium-skilled 5,677 0.819 0.536  0.030  10.789
Low-skilled 5,677 0.980 0.854  0.045  14.200
Shares in labor income          
High-skilled 7,709 0.127 0.128  0.002  0.831
Medium-skilled 7,709 0.570 0.193  0.032  0.984
Low-skilled 7,709 0.303 0.203  0.001  0.959
Labor share  7,571 0.705 0.159  0.022  1.000
Labor market indicators          
Initial unemployment benefit replacement rate (%)  5,698 0.455 0.198 0.010 0.875
Unemployment benefit duration (years)  5,698 0.662 0.198  0.319  1.637
Political indicators          
Left-wing governor  7,709 0.378 0.485  0.000  1.000
Right-wing governor  7,709 0.457 0.498  0.000  1.000
Openness and financial markets          
Export share of production (%)  2,784 0.320 0.280  0.001  2.022
Import penetration (%)  2,800 0.343 0.294  0.001  1.977
Stock market capitalization (% of GDP)  4,471 0.479 0.545  0.012  3.263
Dummy for Germany (1990, 1991)  7,709 0.005 0.074  0.000  1.000  34
Table 2: Tests on Differences in Means 
This Table gives differences in the means before and after 1990, i.e. Difference = (mean 1982-1990) – (mean 1991-2004). ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level 
where the relevant test is a one-sided t-test for difference being significantly positive if Difference > 0 or being significantly negative when Difference < 0. HS = high-skilled 
labor income, MS = medium-skilled labor income, LS = low-skilled labor income, Capital = capital income. 
(a) By sector 
  Absolute volatilities  Relative volatilities 
 Total  HS  MS  LS  Total  HS  MS  LS  Capital 
Food  –0.013    0.009*    0.064  –0.135**  –0.001    0.001    0.005*  –0.007***  –0.002 
Textiles    0.004    0.040    0.178**  –0.048  –0.001 –0.016**  –0.001 –0.005**      0.011 
Wood    0.118***  –0.074    0.139***  –0.013    0.007***  –0.001    0.008***  –0.004*    0.044*** 
Pulp & paper    0.067*    0.070    0.026  –0.056    0.004**    0.003    0.001  –0.004*    0.005 
Chemicals  –0.026  –0.138** –0.094** –0.127*  –0.001  –0.008**  –0.003**  –0.003    0.021*** 
Other metals    0.118***  –0.045    0.083**  –0.042    0.009***    0.0004    0.008***    0.001    0.011* 
Basic metals    0.093***    0.008    0.087***    0.025    0.004***  –0.007*    0.004**  –0.001  –0.005 
Machinery    0.083*  –0.024    0.094*  –0.069    0.005***    0.0002    0.004**  –0.001**    0.019* 
Electrical equipment    0.100***    0.103**    0.108***    0.064    0.001  –0.004  –0.001  –0.013***  –0.017* 
Transport equipment            0.004*    0.002    0.0001  –0.010**   
Metals    0.173***    0.432***    0.130***    0.132***    0.013***    0.015**    0.006*    0.001  –0.092*** 
Mining    0.213**    0.020    0.064  –0.312**    0.023**    0.017*    0.017*  –0.033**  –0.007 
Construction  –0.009  –0.665***    0.014  –0.301***    0.005**  –0.025***    0.007***  –0.010***    0.033*** 
Trade    0.014  –0.176  –0.029  –0.236***    0.004***    0.010***    0.004**  –0.008***    0.027*** 
Hotels    0.060***  –0.019    0.013  –0.098**    0.014***    0.027***    0.013***    0.002    0.033*** 
Transport & comm.  –0.008  –0.147*  –0.015  –0.262***    0.004***  –0.003    0.005***  –0.013***    0.016*** 
Finance    0.026    0.065    0.114***  –0.153    0.004**    0.013**    0.010***  –0.013*    0.021* 
Real estate etc.  –0.218***  –0.202**  –0.298***  –0.901***    0.002*    0.011***    0.001  –0.002    0.049*** 
Public admin.  –0.066***    0.118  –0.001  –0.309**    0.0003    0.018***    0.005**    0.0001    0.009 
Education    0.077***    0.115***    0.168***    0.263***    0.0025**    0.002    0.003  –0.002  –0.077*** 
Health, social  –0.002  –0.227***    0.081*  –0.408***    0.003**    0.002    0.012***  –0.001    0.010 
Other services    0.045*  –0.063    0.014  –0.158**    0.008***    0.006    0.007***  –0.007*    0.021***   35
(b) By country 
  Absolute volatilities  Relative volatilities 
  Total HS  MS  LS Total HS  MS  LS  Capital 
Austria  –0.006  –0.443***    0.065**  –0.169    0.003***  –0.024***    0.007***    0.006*    0.012** 
Denmark    0.035***    0.041*    0.032**  –0.001    0.010***    0.015***    0.009***    0.003*    0.025*** 
Spain    0.134***    0.127    0.314***  –0.008    0.013***    0.024***    0.029***    0.003    0.015*** 
Finland  –0.008 –0.001 –0.004 –0.008 –0.002* –0.001  –0.004**  –0.004**  –0.001 
France    0.003    0.091    0.001  –0.101**  –0.002    0.002  –0.001  –0.014***  –0.001 
Germany    0.057***    0.009    0.057***    0.002  –0.001 –0.009***  –0.002*  –0.005***  –0.054*** 
Italy    0.118***    0.138***    0.112***    0.099***    0.003**    0.002*    0.003**    0.001  –0.027** 
Japan  –0.011  –0.024  –0.036**  –0.211***    0.001*    0.008***  –0.0001  –0.016***    0.018 
Netherlands  –0.057*  –0.431*** –0.191*** –1.17***      0.003*** –0.029*** –0.007*** –0.069***      0.006 
United Kingdom    0.110***    0.075*    0.046  –0.062*    0.022***    0.025***    0.018***    0.009*    0.026*** 
United States  –0.106*** –0.356*** –0.160*** –0.523***     0.003*  –0.007**    0.003*  –0.010***    0.027*** 
   36
Table 3: Determinants of the Absolute Volatility of Labor Income 
The dependent variable is the volatility of conditional labor income growth, computed over a five-year moving 
window [t,  t+4]. The explanatory variables are measured in t. standard errors have been adjusted for 
heterogeneity and autocorrelation of unknown form. t-values are reported in brackets. Fixed effects panel 
regressions with the cross-section dimensions being determined by the combination of 11 countries and 22 
industrial sectors. HS= high-skilled labor income, MS = medium-skilled labor income, LS = low-skilled labor 
income. Time fixed effects are included. ***, **, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  (8) 
 ALL  HS  MS  LS  ALL  HS  MS  LS 
TFP volatility  0.165***  0.190** 0.176*** 0.113 0.095***  0.111  0.118** 0.022
 (3.26)  (2.28) (3.56) (1.54) (3.28)  (1.40)  (2.45) (0.45)
Benefit replacement rate   0.031***  0.054*** 0.030*** 0.008 0.023***  0.032*  0.018 –0.002
 (3.75)  (4.33) (3.68) (0.93) (2.74)  (1.87)  (1.64) (0.16)
Benefit duration   0.003  –0.014** –0.002 –0.019*** 0.009**  –0.001  0.006 –0.007
 (0.99)  (2.46) (0.79) (3.75) (2.54)  (0.11)  (1.54) (1.21)
Union density  0.019  –0.05 –0.011 0.054 –0.02  –0.054  –0.047 –0.03
 (0.59)  (0.89) (0.29) (1.29) (0.59)  (0.83)  (0.96) (0.70)
Political left (0/1)   0.002  0.009*** –0.001 0.009*** –0.004  0.005  –0.002 0.003
 (0.95)  (3.29) (0.36) (3.88) (1.29)  (1.17)  (0.47) (0.87)
Political right (0/1)   0.001  0.003 –0.004 0.005* –0.004  0  –0.005 0
 (0.39)  (1.01) (1.44) (1.70) (1.41)  (0.03)  (1.25) (0.15)
Labor share (%)  –0.008  –0.007 –0.007 –0.014 –0.016  0.008  –0.028 0.008
 (0.42)  (0.27) (0.32) (0.63) (1.62)  (0.30)  (1.37) (0.49)
Share high–skilled    –0.214**   –0.324* 
   (2.12)   (1.78) 
Share medium–skilled    –0.093***     –0.086**
   (2.70)     (2.47)
Share low–skilled    0.160***     0.161***
   (3.01)     (2.68)
Export share     –0.021  0.058  –0.012 –0.022
   (1.20)  (0.88)  (0.49) (0.76)
Import penetration    0.007  –0.01  –0.002 0.025
   (0.31)  (0.12)  (0.09) (0.76)
Stock market capitalization   0.002  0.016**  0.002 0.012***
   (0.79)  (2.38)  (0.65) (3.93)
Dummy Germany (0/1)  0  –0.010* –0.003 0.002 –0.002  –0.016***  –0.004 0.009**
 (0.18)  (1.94) (1.03) (0.71) (0.52)  (3.40)  (0.82) (2.14)
Constant 0.008  0.088*** 0.084*** –0.028 0.026  0.055  0.107*** –0.001
 (0.66)  (3.25) (4.19) (1.00) (1.64)  (1.52)  (3.83) (0.02)
Observations (N * T) 4,682  4,682 4,682 4,682 1,547  1,547  1,547 1,547
Cross-sections (N) 263  263 263 263 129  129  129 129
R²  0.08 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.11  0.1  0.13 0.11
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Table 4: Determinants of the Absolute Volatility of Capital Income 
The dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is the volatility of conditional capital income, computed over a 
five-year moving window (t, t+4). In Columns (3) and (4), a quasi-panel of non-overlapping 5-year windows is 
used. In Columns (5) and (6), a squared residual growth rate is used as a measure of volatility. The explanatory 
variables are measured in t. standard errors have been adjusted for heterogeneity and autocorrelation of unknown 
form. t-values are reported in brackets. Fixed effects panel regressions with the cross-section dimensions being 
determined by the combination of 11 countries and 22 industrial sectors. Time fixed effects are included. ***, 
**, * = significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%-level. 
















TFP volatility  0.901*** 0.800*** 0.825*** 1.069*** 2.092***  3.445**
 (5.51) (2.63) (4.83) (3.13) (2.74)  (2.30)
Benefit replacement rate   0.077** 0.097** 0.085 0.127* 0.036**  0.027**
 (2.01) (2.23) (1.15) (1.96) (2.36)  (2.08)
Benefit duration   0.01 –0.019 –0.027 –0.073 0.029  –0.004
 (0.32) (0.71) (0.67) (1.05) (0.70)  (0.42)
Union density  0.051 –0.319 0.145 –0.207 –0.002  –0.058
 (0.71) (1.05) (1.27) (0.65) (0.05)  (0.73)
Labor share (%)  0.329*** 0.306** 0.435*** 0.312** 0.212***  0.130*
 (4.91) (2.29) (5.02) (2.10) (4.63)  (1.95)
Political left (0/1)   0.012 0.058 0.052 0.114* –0.015  0.007
 (0.78) (1.60) (1.62) (1.68) (1.14)  (0.55)
Political right (0/1)   0.021 0.062* 0.063* 0.118* –0.015  0.01
 (1.18) (1.66) (1.90) (1.72) (1.07)  (0.87)
Export share   0.105 –0.037   0.023
 (0.61) (0.22)   (0.46)
Import penetration  –0.235 –0.001   –0.015
 (1.03) (0.00)   (0.34)
Stock market capitalization  0.002 –0.01   0.003
 (0.28) (1.13)   (0.62)
Dummy Germany (0/1)  0.003 –0.006 –0.006 –0.004 –0.044**  –0.028*
 (0.15) (0.31) (0.24) (0.16) (2.39)  (1.80)
Constant –0.212*** –0.047 –0.340*** –0.13 –0.159***  –0.064
 (3.08) (0.52) (3.19) (1.10) (3.88)  (1.51)
Observations (N * T) 4,240 1,374 901 324 4,969  1,697
Cross-sections (N) 236 114 236 114 236  114
R² 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.23 0.04  0.17
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Table 5: Determinants of the Relative Volatility of Labor to Capital Income 
The dependent variable is the volatility of conditional labor relative to capital income, computed over a five–year 
moving window (t, t+4). The explanatory variables are measured in t. standard errors have been adjusted for 
heterogeneity and autocorrelation of unknown form. t–values are reported in brackets. Fixed effects panel 
regressions with the cross–section dimensions being determined by the combination of 11 countries and 22 
industrial sectors. HS= high–skilled, MS = medium–skilled, LS = low–skilled. ***, **, * = robust at the 1%, 5%, 
10%–level. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 All  All  HS  HS  MS  MS  LS  LS 
TFP volatility  0.297  0.618 –2.743** –2.396* –0.394 0.439  –2.252* –0.758
 (0.39)  (0.99) (2.20) (1.67) (0.46) (0.51)  (1.83) (0.64)
Benefit replacement rate   0.136  0.085 0.239 –0.061 –0.037 –0.176  –0.268* –0.378*
 (1.26)  (0.62) (1.13) (0.27) (0.23) (0.94)  (1.76) (1.68)
Benefit duration   –0.034  0.06 –0.251** 0.008 –0.091 0.003  –0.411*** –0.138
 (0.55)  (0.85) (2.26) (0.06) (1.57) (0.04)  (3.46) (1.29)
Union density  –0.479*  –1.029 –1.734*** –0.055 –0.988** –1.537* –0.241 –1.325
 (1.72)  (1.44) (2.60) (0.03) (2.43) (1.82)  (0.57) (1.60)
Political left (0/1)   0.038*  –0.045 0.129** –0.048 0.001 –0.06  0.150*** –0.014
 (1.68)  (1.11) (2.59) (0.53) (0.02) (1.25)  (2.81) (0.22)
Political right (0/1)   –0.005  –0.081* 0.088 –0.055 –0.045 –0.079*  0.055 –0.069
 (0.17)  (1.91) (1.55) (0.76) (1.21) (1.79)  (0.73) (1.28)
Labor share (%)  –0.509**  –0.370* –1.250*** –0.587 –0.777*** –0.690** –1.078** –0.69
 (2.15)  (1.74) (3.15) (0.81) (2.65) (2.20)  (2.26) (1.35)
Share high-skilled    –0.841 –5.463*  
   (0.71) (1.83)  
Share medium-skilled    –1.442*** –1.687** 
   (3.61) (2.17) 
Share low-skilled      2.771*** 2.962***
     (3.95) (3.02)
Export share     –0.041 –0.032 0.02  –0.366
   (0.11) (0.04) (0.04)  (0.72)
Import penetration    0.188 0.742 0.394  0.972
   (0.42) (0.91) (0.74)  (1.47)
Stock market capitalization   0.073* 0.259** 0.108  0.290**
   (1.67) (1.99) (1.60)  (2.56)
Dummy Germany (0/1)  0.04  0.054 –0.056 –0.043 0.018 0.065  0.046 0.201**
 (1.21)  (0.91) (0.77) (0.45) (0.47) (0.87)  (0.62) (2.27)
Constant 0.754***  0.670* 2.394*** 1.442* 2.240*** 2.262***  1.148*** 0.514
 (3.76)  (1.97) (5.49) (1.93) (6.78) (3.31)  (2.60) (0.98)
Observations (N * T) 4,240  1,374 4,240 1,374 4,240 1,374  4,240 1,374
Cross-sections (N) 236  114 236 114 236 114  236 114
R² 0.04  0.05 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.07  0.06 0.11
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